To credit such a distinction yields even greater absurdity in other cases. Imagine a version of Palsgraf in which the defendant train attendant is a bigot who intentionally jostles the boarding youth in order to murder her, because the attendant wishes to murder an Indian person with plausible deniability, believes that the youth is a famous stage actor, Sonia, and believes that Sonia is Indian. As it turns out, the train attendant is multiply mistaken: The youth is not Sonia, and Sonia is Italian, not Indian. The resulting explosion causes some scales to drop at the other end of the station, injuring three unforeseeable victims — Elise (French), Amna (Indian), and Sonia (who just happens to be at the station, waiting for a train). Without a doctrine of transferred intent, the law will of course deny Elise recovery, which seems perverse enough. As to Amna and Sonia, the law will need to determine how to characterize the content of the train attendant’s murderous intention (an intention to kill Sonia, or an intention to kill an Indian, or . . . ?). The exercise seems ludicrous, and there does not seem to be any morally or metaphysically principled way to carry it out.
Что думаешь? Оцени!，这一点在WhatsApp Web 網頁版登入中也有详细论述
。谷歌是该领域的重要参考
Наука и техника。whatsapp对此有专业解读
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